Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Al Bench, as Fire Marshall and Fire Chief of the Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Al Bench, as Fire
Marshall and Fire Chief of the Rockville-Springdale
Fire Protection District : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Terry R. West; Attorney for Appellant.
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.; Stirba and Hathaway; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





K F U 
50 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF AbfiCitSfl NO. ^OOZ^-gf 




AL BENCH, as Fire Marshall and Fire 




Case No. 960024-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS, AUGUST 30,1995. APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER 
IN CASE ENTERED DECEMBER 12,1995 OF THE DISTRICT 
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Judy fi*6 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR., (Bar No. 4219) J Z I B C T~\ 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY • •* I !™-l—•!-• 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 JUK! 2 3 1996 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-8300 C O U R T O F A P P E A L S 
TERRY WEST (Bar No. 4770) 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
P.O. Box 450 
Springdale, Utah 84767 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




AL BENCH, as Fire Marshall and Fire 




Case No. 960024-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
CROSS-APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS, AUGUST 30,1995. APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER 
IN CASE ENTERED DECEMBER 12,1995 OF THE DISTRICT 
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR., (Bar No. 4219) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
TERRY WEST (Bar No. 4770) 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
P.O. Box 450 
Springdale, Utah 84767 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 




I. THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, THEREFORE THE 
ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER ARE MOOT AND THIS 
CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED T 
II. INDIAN VILLAGE HAD OTHER PLAIN, ADEQUATE AND SPEEDY 
REMEDIES 4 
III. RESPONDENT IS NOT AN ENTITY RECOGNIZED UNDER RULE 
65B(e)(2)(A) AND (B) AGAINST WHICH RELIEF UNDER THE RULE 
IS APPROPRIATE 6 
IV. THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER IS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF RULE 65B 8 
CONCLUSION 11 
c:\ugt\weststate\appeal.rep | i *me 27, * ^ 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d at 283 (Utah 1956) 5 
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427 (Utah App. 1996) 2 
Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995) 3 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966) 7 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988) 9 
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770 (Utah 1970) 4 
Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) 9 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) 9 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983) . . 5 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 78 P2d 1044 (Utah 1980) 4 
Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982) 3 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 1 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B 6, 7, 8, 10 
OTHER 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 10 
WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3533 3 
c:\ugt\wesUtate\appeal.rep j j j June 27, 1996 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, THEREFORE THE ISSUES RAISED 
BY PETITIONER ARE MOOT AND THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
In its Brief in Opposition to Respondent's Cross-Appeal, the 
Petitioner attempts to sidestep the mootness issue by framing a 
controversy based on factual allegations that were not in the 
Petitioner7s original Petition below and do not appear anywhere in 
the record. Petitioner argues that its claim is not moot since an 
actual controversy exists. Petitioner maintains that Al Bench 
"abused his discretion" in his conclusions reached based on the 
November 1, 1991 flow test; that Table III-B of the Uniform Fire Code 
gives the Petitioner "the right to have three or more fire hydrants 
to protect its building"; that Petitioner, in fact, installed four 
fire hydrants; that four hydrants equally spaced around the building 
give more protection than three hydrants; and, that Petitioner spent 
a considerable amount of money for hydrant No. 3 and 200 feet of 
supply line, and therefore, "an actual controversy between the 
parties" exists. (See Petitioner's Brief, p. 7.) The Petitioner's 
reasoning is, in short, non sequitur. 
Aside from its logical infirmity, Petitioner's argument is 
fundamentally wrong and procedurally flawed. The Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss below was based on the language in the Petition and 
brought pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as 
true the allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint and has to 
determine whether or not a legally cognizable claim lies against the 
named Defendant based on the accepted facts and all logical 
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inferences drawn therefrom. See, Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 
(Utah App. 1996). Petitioner's Petition named as Respondents Al 
Bench as Fire Marshall and former Fire Chief of the Rockville-
Springdale Fire Protection District. R.00001-00003. Petitioner 
claims for relief in its Complaint, 
That the Court review the Fire Chief's decision 
made on December 10, 1991, and take evidence on 
the issues raised therein, to determine if the 
water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991, 
showed that the Petitioner's fire protection 
system did not comply with Table No. A-III-A-1 
[sic] of the Uniform Fire Code, and determine if 
the test showed that the system was not adequate 
for safe fire fighting capabilities, and 
specifically whether hydrant No. 3 was a 
dangerous hydrant. . . . 
Id. 
It is undisputed that at all times during the proceeding below, 
and thereafter, Al Bench was not the Fire Chief, was not the Fire 
Marshall, and was not affiliated as an official or member of the 
Rockville-Springdale Fire District. The Fire District was not at any 
time a party to the action below. Whether or not, as the Petitioner 
argues, Al Bench, when he was the Chief, abused his discretion is of 
no bearing in determining whether or not the Petitioner's claim is 
moot. Further, Table III of the Uniform Fire Code does not create a 
right to ,f3 or more hydrants" for Petitioner, nor does it create a 
right to fire protection in any person or entity. (See Petitioner's 
Opening Brief, Exhibit "C"). Whether or not Table III of the Uniform 
Fire Code creates in the Petitioner a right to three or more fire 
hydrants to protect its facility, and what the Petitioner did in an 
attempt to bring his property into compliance with the Uniform Fire 
Code, has no bearing on a mootness determination. If the judicial 
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relief requested by the Petitioner cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants, the case is moot. See Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 
P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995). If, as the Petitioner apparently seeks, 
the court below were to conclude that Al Bench as the Fire Chief 
abused his discretion in interpreting the results of the November 1, 
1991 flow test, and order Al Bench to approve the Indian Village 
system as being safe for fire fighting capabilities and require Al 
Bench to allow Terry West to reinstall the third fire hydrant and use 
his 200 feet of abandoned line, such a ruling would have no effect. 
Al Bench as a lay person and citizen of Springdale has no authority 
to approve the November 1, 1991 version of the Indian Village Trading 
Post fire hydrant system nor does he have authority to allow Terry 
West to reactivate his hydrant No. 3 and utilize the 200 feet of 
abandoned supply line. Whatever the Court may ultimately order in 
response to the Petition will in no way affect the right of the 
litigants. Id. When an issue or case becomes moot, "fundamental 
principles of procedure dictate that [courts] do not adjudicate moot 
cases . . ." Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982). 
The case below is driven by only one thing, and that is the 
Petitioner's insatiable drive for vindication. A favorable result 
for Petitioner would satisfy no other purpose. However, Utah courts 
do not render advisory opinions and are reluctant to "waste their 
limited resources simply to satisfy curiosity or a naked desire for 
vindication". WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION 2D § 3533; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 78 P2d 1044, 1045 (Utah 
1980). 
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Petitionees claims are moot, and the court below erred in not 
granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss below. 
II. INDIAN VILLAGE HAD OTHER PLAIN# ADEQUATE AND 
SPEEDY REMEDIES, 
To prevail on a Rule 65B petition, the petition must on its face 
assert that no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy existed, and 
that Petitioner must show ultimately that indeed this is so. See 
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1970). There is no 
reference in the Petition that no other plain, adequate or speedy 
remedy exists, nor did Petitioner show below, or has it shown in its 
Brief, that no such remedy exists. R.00001-00003. The mere fact 
that Petitioner failed to plead that no plain, adequate or speedy 
remedy existed, is of itself sufficient to justify the denial of the 
writ. Jenkins, at 772. 
Petitioner argues in its Brief that since the Fifth District 
Court, in another proceeding, involving other parties, suggested that 
Petitioner could file a claim against the Fire Chief, "if he so 
desires," which notably the Petitioner construes as a direction of 
the court; and since counsel for the Fire District in a prior Fifth 
District Court matter involving other parties, which matter is not 
before this Court, and is not the subject of this appeal or otherwise 
recorded, stated that the appropriate Rule 65B remedy might be 
against the Fire Chief, see Petitioner's Brief, pp. 8-10, it follows 
that the Petitioner had no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy. 
Aside from making no logical sense, Petitioner mistakenly 
perceives that the Fifth District Court is in the business of 
representing a litigant's interests and rendering a litigant legal 
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advice. Likewise, Petitioner supposes that the statements made by 
counsel for the Fire District are somehow either legal advice and 
instruction to him or tantamount to legal precedence or orders of the 
court. What the Court below and opposing counsel said to Petitioner 
in another proceeding is neither the law of the case or legal 
precedence. Neither the court, nor the Fire District's counsel 
represent Petitioner, nor does either have any obligation to advise 
Petitioner of its legal rights or represent its interest. The 
Petitioner's reliance on these statements for purposes of authority 
rebutting the Respondent's argument that other plain and adequate 
remedies existed, is for that reason and otherwise logically 
misplaced. 
Almost immediately upon receiving the findings based on then 
Chief Bench's November 1, 1991 flow test, Petitioner sought and 
received a hearing before a special blue chip appeals board convened 
by the Fire District on January 30, 1992. R. 00132. That appeals 
board upheld the findings and conclusions of then Chief Bench in 
every respect. The disappointed Petitioner's appropriate response at 
that point would have been an appeal of the appeals board's decision 
to the State District Court. Petitioner chose not to do so. 
Likewise when Petitioner received adverse rulings in the Fifth 
District in the other matters to which it has freely referred, it 
could have appealed. It chose not to do so. Unfortunately, it is 
not the call of Rule 65B to provide an avenue for appeal when an 
appeal in the ordinary course has gone stale. See Anderson v. Baker, 
296 P.2d at 283, 286 (Utah 1956); and Merrihew v. Salt Lake County 
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
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As Petitioner could have appealed the January 3 0, 1992 Special 
Appeals Board determination had it chosen to do so, and as Petitioner 
could have appealed several other related adverse rulings of the 
Fifth District, had it chosen to do so but instead allowed the 
appropriate time period in which appeal to lapse, it had other plain, 
adequate and speedy remedies and the Court erred in not dismissing 
its Petition for an Extraordinary Writ. 
III. RESPONDENT IS NOT AN ENTITY RECOGNIZED UNDER 
RULE 65B(e)(2)(A) AND (B) AGAINST WHICH RELIEF 
UNDER THE RULE IS APPROPRIATE. 
Petitioner seeks relief in Petition under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65B(e)(2)(A) and/or (B) . R. 00001-00003. These 
subsections of Rule 65B provide in relevant part that relief under 
the rule may be appropriate •• (A) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has 
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust 
or station;11. Id. The Respondent Al Bench was not, nor can it 
factually be argued, at any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding below, nor is he presently, an inferior court, an 
administrative agency, an officer exercising judicial functions, a 
corporation, or a person who has a duty of office, trust or station. 
At the time leading up to and following shortly after the November 1, 
1991 flow test and the January 30, 1992 Special Appeals Board, the 
Respondent Al Bench served as the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall for 
the Rockville-Springdale Fire District. R. 00132. 
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Petitioner argues in its Brief that the court below had 
authority to review the Respondent's decision below because the 
Respondent's act was that "of an administrative agency" and because 
the Petitioner "alleges that the administrative agency's Fire Chief 
has abused his discretion." Petitioner's Brief, p. 10. Petitioner 
does not provide any legal authority, indication in the pleadings, or 
reference to the record that indicates that the Respondent indeed was 
an administrative agency. During the time of the November 1, 1991 
flow test, the Respondent was, at best, a single representative of 
the Rockville-Springdale Fire District acting under the authority of 
that District. He was not during that time frame an agency as 
contemplated by the rules, nor did ultimate issues of compliance rest 
with him. The Petitioner sought the review of Respondent's decision 
by the Fire District Special Appeals Board, which Petitioner 
received. An individual member of a district or agency does not 
constitute the represented agency as defined by Utah law. See Great 
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah 
1966). 
There is no further argument that Al Bench was at any point in 
time an inferior court, an officer exercising judicial functions, a 
corporation or a person with a duty as a result of his office, trust 
or station. 
The Petitioner raises for the first time in its Brief the 
concept that it may be entitled to relief under Rule 65B(e)(2)(C) 
since, it argues, "the Fire Chief had a duty to approve the system, 
and the cross-appellee had a right to use its system." Petitioner's 
Brief, p. 11. In its original Petition, at the hearing on the Motion 
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to Dismiss and finally at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner never 
made this argument nor sought relief under Rule 65B(e)(2)(C). R. 
00001-00003. Neither does the Petitioner seek in its Petition an 
order forcing the Respondent to "perform an act required by law as a 
duty of his office, trust or station." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (2) (B) . 
In its Petition, the Petitioner asks the court below to "review the 
Fire Chief's decision made on December 10, 1991 . . . and determine 
if the tests showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire 
fighting capabilities. . ." R. 00001-00003. It was this Petition 
upon which Petitioner sought extraordinary relief under Rule 65B, and 
upon which the Motion to Dismiss was based, not the arguments in 
Petitioner's Brief otherwise unsupported by the record below. 
As the Respondent is not an inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer exercising judicial functions, a corporation or 
person of office, trust or station, the court below erred in not 
dismissing the Petition. 
IV. THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER IS NOT WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF RULE 65B. 
In its Brief, Petitioner argues that since then Chief Bench's 
November 1, 1991 flow test "showed that the fire hydrant system water 
flowed 3,210 GPM, 460 GPM more than what Table III-A of the U.F.C. 
requires, and that since Petitioner's Rule 65B Petition asked the 
Court to review the Fire Chief's decision which was based on the test 
results found in Bench's letter dated December 10, 1991, that the 
court below did not err in denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss." 
Petitioner's Brief, pp.12-13. Again, Petitioner's argument is an 
utter non sequitur. Petitioner correctly points out that the relief 
c:\ugt\wcststotc\appcal.rep Q June 27, 1996 
sought in its Petition is a review of the Respondent's decision based 
on the November 1, 1991 flow test and a determination of whether or 
not, "the tests showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire 
fighting capabilities, and specifically whether hydrant No. 3 was a 
dangerous hydrant." R. 00001-00003. It is this relief articulated 
by the Petitioner in its Petition which is not sanctionable under 
Rule 65B. "Where the responsibility for basic policy decisions has 
been committed to one of the branches of our tri-partite system of 
government, the courts have refrained from sitting in judgment of the 
propriety of those decisions." Little v. Utah State Div. of Family 
Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 
P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). While Petitioner would like the Court to 
become in essence a super fire chief and state that Respondent made 
the wrong decision, and that in fact, Petitioner's fire hydrant 
system is safe for fire fighting purposes, this form of relief is 
beyond that contemplated by Rule 65B. The findings of fact gathered 
by Respondent in its flow test and as reviewed and affirmed by the 
Special Appeals Board on January 30, 1992, are to be "accorded 
substantial deference and will not be overturned if based on 
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible." See Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 
P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988). When an appropriate petition is 
filed, the court will only review the record below to determine 
whether an agency, a judicial officer, or inferior tribunal abused 
its discretion, or whether the petitioner was otherwise denied due 
process. The courts are not to review and reverse the agency's, 
inferior tribunal, or judicial officer's decision. Proceeding based 
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on the relief sought in the Petition in this case is anathema to the 
tri-partite system and the deference afforded inferior tribunals, 
administrative agencies, judicial officers, corporations and persons 
of office, trust or station by the reviewing court. The court below 
therefore erred in not dismissing the Petition on this basis alone. 
The Petitioner raises for the first time in its Brief the 
concept that Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution vests 
general appellate jurisdiction in the District Court, impliedly over 
the Respondent's conduct below. Petitioner's Response Brief, p. 13. 
Again, Petitioner did not seek a review in the District Court 
pursuant to Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution in its 
Petition nor was this in any way raised in or even a part of the 
court proceedings below. Moreover, Article VIII Section 5 provides 
that "the district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this Constitution or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute." This general 
grant of Section 5 of Article VIII does not obviate the requirements 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and in particular Rule 65B nor does it obviate the 
requirement that an appeal be sought in a timely manner as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or otherwise in the 
applicable administrative act. It is naive for Petitioner to argue 
that the Utah Constitution provides for a right of appeal unfettered 
by any time limitation, procedural requirement or any other sort of 
limitation provided otherwise in statute, rule of procedure, or 
administrative regulation. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and as more fully discussed in 
Respondent's Cross-Appellant's Brief, Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court find that the Fifth District Court erred in 
denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and enter an order of 
dismissal. 
DATED this ^ [ day of June, 1996. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
BENSON L. HATHAT) 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellee 
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